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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Thus the injunctions were denied; the wiretaps
were held admissible, and the federal courts again
refused to tamper with state proceedings.
State prosecutors were cheered, things seemed
to be going well-but their cheer was to be short
lived. Five days later, the state court judge, in
the O'Rourke case, reversed his position.42 This
surprising turnabout was based, ironically, on
the federal court's language in refusing to enjoin
the use of the evidence now held inadmissible.
Thus it appears that the federal courts may finally
be meeting with some success in attempting to
persuade state tribunals against the admission of
wiretap evidence by strength of reason rather
than by direct intervention. Meanwhile, the Su-
preme Court has granted Pugach certiorari from
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.43
The position of the state court witness asked
to testify to the contents of a wiretap is another
area confused by the decisions in Schwartz and
N.Y. TimEs, April 20, 1960. County Court Judge
Widlitz refused to admit the challenged wiretap evi-
dence, relying on the opinion of judge Waterman of the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Pugach v.
Dollinger, supra note 41, and on the fact that: "the
Court [of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Pugach
decision] is unanimous and unequivocal in its opinion
that the introduction of wiretap evidence would con-
stitute a violation of a federal criminal statute."
4
3 Pugach v. Dollinger, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 3376 (U.S.
June 28, 1960) (No. 968).
Benanti. On the one hand he can refuse to testify
to a wiretap on the ground that §605 gives him
a privilege, thereby subjecting himself to state
contempt proceedings, or, he can choose to avoid
the more immediate threat of contempt, testify
to the wiretap, and thereby subject himself to a
federal criminal prosecution for violation of §605.
However, it would seem that compelling such
testimony would amount to a denial of due process
under the fourteenth amendment, in that the
witness would be forced to commit a federal crime
in order to escape the contempt citation.
As for the legislatures and courts left in the
dark by the decisions in this area, it can only be
reiterated that under the Benanti decision, state
statutes permitting wiretapping are dearly pre-
empted by §605 of the Federal Communications
Act. State statutes punishing wiretapping may
also be preempted, and in any case are of doubtful
constitutionality.44 State courts admitting wiretap
evidence are unquestionably supported by the
decision of the highest court in the land.45 They
are also unquestionably acting in direct violation
of §605 of the Federal Communications Act.
46
LAWRENCE M. DUBIN
44 See notes 10, 11, and 15-17 supra and accompany-
ing text.
15 Schwartz v. Texas, supra note 18.
46 Nardone v. United States, supra note 2; Benanti
v. United States, supra note 5.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Abstractors
Richard K. Janger* and Alan H. Swanson*
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Defendants were con-
victed in federal court of wiretapping in violation
of the Federal Communications Act. On certiorari,
they contended that the trial court erred in admit-
ting as evidence recordings illegally seized by state
officers acting without involvement of federal
officers. In reversing and remanding, the Supreme
Court overruled the "silver platter" doctrine and
held that evidence seized by state officers with-
* Senior Law Students, Northwestern University
School of Law.
out federal participation must be excluded in a
federal criminal trial if the search and seizure would
have been unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment if conducted by federal officers. Mr. justice
Frankfurter, with justices Clark, Harlan, and
Whittaker concurring in part, dissented. See also
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-United States v.
Vasquez, 183 F.Supp. 190 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). De-
fendant was indicted for unlawfully purchasing and
importing narcotics. He moved to suppress the
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heroin found in his possession because custom
officers, although authorized by 26 U.S.C.A. §7607
to arrest without a warrant in certain situations,
here had the duty to obtain a warrant since one day
prior to the arrest they were informed of the plan
to deliver the narcotics to defendant. The District
Court held that the officers here did not have suffi-
cient information to support an application for a
search warrant until the drugs came into de-
fendant's possession and, in any case, the statute
was not limited to situations where officers have in-
sufficient time to procure a warrant but may be
invoked whenever there is reasonable cause to
believe that a violation has been or is being
committed.
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-People v. Mayo,
166 N.E.2d 440 (Ill. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed of the unlawful possession of papers and
documents used in playing "policy." On appeal, he
contended that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the use in evidence of certain
policy- slips found by a police officer in searching
defendant's car after arresting him for a mere park-
ing violation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that since the arrest for a mere parking violation
did not justify a search of defendant's car the
policy slips were procured by an illegal search and
therefore were not admissible in evidence notwith-
standing the fact that the "policy" slips constituted
contraband material. One judge dissented. Com-
pare People v. Watkins, infra.
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-People v. Watkins,
166 N.E.2d 433 (Ill. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed of the possession of "policy" slips. On ap-
peal, he contended that police officers, who had
arrested him on previous occasions and who, after
noting his car illegally parked and seeing him
emerge from a building only to run back in upon
realizing that they were watching him, arrested and
searched him, violated his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures and that
policy tickets obtained by the search were im-
properly admitted in evidence. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that defendant's right was not
violated since the circumstances made it reasonable
for the arresting officers to assume that they were
dealing with a situation more serious than a routine
parking violation. One judge, concurring specially,
objected to the majority opinion which he felt over-
ruled previous Illinois decisions holding the search
of a person a proper incident to a valid arrest for
traffic violations.
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-Slate v. Wolf,
164 A.2d 865 (Del. 1960). Defendant was charged
with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
He filed a motion in the trial court to supress the
results of an analysis of a blood sample on the
ground that the taking of the blood sample was an
illegal search and seizure. Upon acceptance of the
trial court's certification of the question as to the
admissibility of this evidence, the Supreme Court
held that evidence as to intoxication based on a
blood sample taken by a qualified physician from
a person who is unconscious is not admissible under
the Delaware Constitution in a criminal proceeding
against such person even though the person's un-
consciousness was not the result of any action on
the part of the state authorities.
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-Martell v. Kling-
man, 105 N.W.2d 446 (Wis. 1960). Defendant and
his insurer were held liable in a civil action arising
out of an automobile accident. On appeal, the in-
surer contended that a urine specimen, obtained
within two hours after the collision, as well as
testimony as to its analysis, were erroneously ad-
mitted into evidence, on the ground that the
specimen was obtained as a result of an unreason-
able search and seizure. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the evidence was not ob-
tained as a result of an unreasonable search and
seizure and was therefore admissible even though
defendant, while in a semiconscious state and not
under arrest, had voluntarily urinated in a bottle
held by a police officer without knowledge that the
officers attending him were intent upon obtaining
evidence as to the alcoholic content of his blood.
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-Sdepps v. City of
El Paso, 338 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. 1960). A district
court gave judgment confiscating dice, a blanket,
and money taken in a police raid on a crap game.
On appeal, Schepps, one of the participants in the
game, contended that the Texas Penal Code only
authorizes the confiscation of gambling parapher-
nalia, which includes money found in gambling
devices such a slot machines and pin-ball machines
but not money whose title and possession are un-
disputed and which is used as a medium of ex-
change in paying off bets already consummated.
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded,
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holding that money is not gambling equipment
per se and in the absence of evidence showing that
the money confiscated was part of the gambling
equipment or paraphernalia, the money would have
to be returned to the appellant.
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-Moody v. United
States, 163 A.2d 337 (D.C. 1960). Defendant was
convicted of unlawful entry and petit larceny. On
appeal, he contended that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress certain evidence on
the ground that it had been secured by search and
seizure in contravention of the Fourth Amendment.
The Municipal Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that, where the complaining witness, a private
citizen, went into defendant's apartment and
gathered up the articles claimed to have been
stolen from him by the defendant and then handed
them to an officer who had remained in the hall-
way, there was a participation in the search and
seizure by the arresting officer, the complaining
witness acting as an arm of the police in reducing
the articles to their possession, and therefore the
evidence so obtained had been improperly ad-
mitted.
Attorney-Client Privilege-Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). Defendant, an attorney,
was adjudged to be in civil contempt. On appeal, he
contended that he could not be compelled to give
the Internal Revenue Service names of clients who
employed him to voluntarily pay unassessed sums
of income tax because such information was a
privileged communication between an attorney
and his client. The Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that in applying the law of the forum state
(California), an attorney cannot be compelled to
identify his client when the only purpose in doing
so is to show the client's recognition of his own
guilt, and here the clients' names were material to
the government only to ascertain which taxpayers
believed themselves to be delinquent in their taxes.
Attorney-Client Privilege-In re Kaplan, 168
N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1960). Defendant, a lawyer, was
committed to jail until such time when he would
agree to tell the New York City Commissioner of
Investigation the name of the client who gave him
information, which he had turned over to the Com-
missioner, concerning two corrupt politicians who
approved the illegal parking of trailer trucks. On
appeal, defendant contended that his incarceration
for contempt was unlawful because he was en-
titled to withhold his client's name under the at-
torney-client privilege. The Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that despite frequent statements
that the client's identity is not covered by the
attorney-client privilege, the circumstances of each
case must be considered, and where the client's
communication to his attorney was in the aid of a
public purpose to expose wrongdoing and was
made available to the public authorities, and where
the client's identity is not necessary to establish
the attorney-client relationship but was the very
fact which required secrecy because of possible
reprisals, then defendant attorney could not
properly be jailed for contempt for failure to dis-
close his client's identity.
Concealed Weapons-State v. Bordeaux, 337
S.W.2d 47 (Mo. 1960). Defendant was convicted of
carrying a concealed weapon. On appeal, he con-
tended that the evidence was insufficient to support
the judgment that he had violated the Missouri
statute prohibiting the carrying of a dangerous or
deadly weapon concealed "upon or about" one's
person. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
where police officers testified that they "saw no
weapon" as they drove alongside defendant's
automobile but that a gun was in such a place in
the automobile that the driver was able to reach it
while driving, there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port a finding of concealment "upon or about" the
person.
Confessions-United States v. Coppola, 281 F.2d
340 (2d Cir. 1960). Defendant was convicted of
bank robbery. On appeal, he contended that ad-
missions made by him to federal officers during a
period of illegal detention by local police having a
working agreement with the F.B.I. should not have
been received in evidence by the trial court. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the facts
showed that defendant was arrested and detained
by the local police on their own initiative and that
the legality of the detention under state law has no
bearing on the admissibility of the evidence in a
federal proceeding where federal agents neither
caused nor contributed to the illegal delay by the
local officers.
Confessions-Middrow v. United States, 281 F.2d
903 (9th Cir. 1960). Defendant was convicted of
taking and opening mail left for collection. On ap-
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peal, he contended that the trial court erred in ad-
mitting his confession because there had been an
unnecessary delay in his arraignment. Local police
had held defendant in custody over a two day
weekend before federal authorities were notified.
After unsuccessfully attempting to contact the
nearest Commissioner, the federal agent questioned
defendant for six hours, after which he was ar-
raigned. The Court of Appeals affirmed the con-
viction, holding that the only delay to be con-
sidered is that occurring while defendant was in
federal custody. The six hour delay was held
reasonable since the federal officer acted immedi-
ately, although unsuccessfully, to contact the near-
est Commissioner, and therefore the defendant's
confession, though given before arraignment, was
admissible.
Confessions-riffith v. Rhay, 282 F.2d 711 (9th
Cir. 1960). After being convicted of murder in a
state court, defendant applied for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court, but it was denied. On ap-
peal, defendant claimed that his confession should
not have been admitted at the trial as he had given
it without assistance from counsel and while in a
hospital under medication with a narcotic. The
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and re-
manded, holding that the admission of defendant's
confession deprived him of due process under the
fourteenth amendment because it was unreason-
able to infer that he knew of his right to remain
silent during questioning or to have legal assistance
when his youth and background were considered,
and that even if aware of his rights, his failure to
request counsel while under medication with a
narcotic could not constitute a waiver of his right
to counsel.
Confessions-State v. Hodge, 105 N.W.2d 613
(Iowa 1960). Defendant was convicted of murder in
the first degree. On appeal, he contended that since
he had been held for some 24 hours without a
charge filed or an arraignment held, during which
time he did not have the advice of counsel or, as-
sertedly, the opportunity to procure counsel or to
communicate with his wife, the trial court erred in
admitting into evidence a purported confession ob-
tained during this period of detention. The Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding that these facts in
and of themselves did not make the obtaining of
the confession violative of defendant's constitu-
tional rights or of due process since it did not ap-
pear that the confession was involuntary or that
defendant was held solely for the purpose of ob-
taining a confession but rather for the purpose of,
investigating all the circumstances and other facts
connecting defendant with the crime, and, there-
fore, the admission of the confession into evidence
was proper, the Court explicitly refusing to follow
the practice of the federal courts which excludes
from evidence those confessions obtained during a
period of illegal detention.
Conspiracy-Unied States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51
(1960). Defendants, who were husband and wife,
were indicted for conspiring to illicitly bring goods
into the United States. The District Court dis-
missed the indictment holding that a husband and
wife are legally incapable of conspiring. On direct
appeal, the government contended that a husband
and wife are within the scope of 18 U.S.C.A. §371
which makes it an offense for two persons to con-
spire to commit an offense against the United
States. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
holding that a husband and wife are legally capable
of conspiracy because the medieval concept of a
husband and wife being one person in law no longer
applies, marital harmony must yield to Congress'
unqualified prohibition of a conspiracy between
two persons, and a woman should not be presumed
to act under the coercive influence of her husband
as such a presumption is contrary to modem
realities. Chief Justice Warren, with whom Justices
Black and Whittaker joined, dissented.
Discovery-People v. Wolff, 167 N.E.2d 197 (Ill.
1960). Defendant was convicted of armed robbery.
On appeal, he contended that he was wrongfully
denied the right to examine certain documents
allegedly possessed by the prosecution which con-
tained statements made by a witness for the
prosecution. Although the Supreme Court judi-
cially adopted the federal Jencks Act formula, it
nevertheless affirmed the conviction on the ground
that the denial of discovery in the instant case was
harmless error.
Discovery-State v. Lavallee, 163 A.2d 856 (Vt.
1960). Defendant was convicted of assault and rob-
bery. On appeal, he contended that the trial court
erred in denying his petition for pre-trial inspection
of certain statements and records in the State's
possession. Although the Supreme Court, in its
opinion, apparently adopted a restricted version of
19611
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the Jencks Act formula, stating that such state-
ments and records should under no circumstances
be turned over to defendant until the court has
determined their relevancy, the Court affirmed on
the narrower ground that defendant's petition was
premature and improper in that it did not request
an in camera determination by the trial judge of the
relevancy of the statements and that even under
the Jencks Act formula such statements would not
be turned over to a defendant until after the witness
had testified on direct examination.
Embezzlement-State v. Harris, 164 A.2d 399
(Conn. 1960). Defendant was convicted of theft
and embezzlement. On appeal, he contended that
the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
that if it found that he was the owner of one
hundred per cent of the stock of the corporation
from which he had taken funds, then he could not
be guilty of embezzlement. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that even though defendant
owned all the capital stock of the corporation, he
could nevertheless be held guilty of the statutory
crime of embezzlement by agent upon a finding that
he had misappropriated the funds of such corpora-
tion with the intent to defraud it.
Exclusion from Courtroom--California v. Elliot,
354 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed of sex perversion. On appeal, she contended
that the committing magistrate, by permitting a
newspaper reporter to remain in the courtroom
during a preliminary examination over defendant's
objection, violated CAL. PENA CODE §868 which
compels the exclusion of unauthorized persons from
the preliminary examination upon defendant's re-
quest. The California Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, holding that because the defendant's
statutory right to exclude persons from the court-
room during the preliminary examination had been
violated, the information gained at the preliminary
examination must be set aside and that therefore
the trial court was without jurisdiction to proceed.
Habeas Corpus-Parker v. Ellis, 80 Sup. Ct.
909 (1960). After being convicted of check forgery
by a state court, defendant, seeking exoneration,
applied for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court, but it was denied. On certiorari,
defendant contended that the state court's refusal
to appoint counsel constituted a denial of de-
fendant's right to due process of law under the
fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court held
that it lacked jurisdiction because defendant's
contention was rendered moot since he had been
released from state prison, having satisfied his
sentence. The Chief justice, with whom justices
Black, Douglas, and Brennan concurred, dissented
on the ground that the conviction was in flagrant
violation of defendant's constitutional rights and
that defendant's desire for exoneration would in-
sure an adverse proceeding, the lack of which was
the basis for refusing to decide the controversy
because of mootness.
Husband-Wife Privilege-Wyatt v. United
States, 80 Sup. Ct. 901 (1960). Defendant was
convicted of knowingly transporting his wife in
interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution
in violation of the Mann Act. On appeal, he con-
tended that the trial court erred in forcing his
wife to testify against him when both he and his
wife invoked the husband-wife privilege. The
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that one who
commits a shameful crime against his wife and the
marital relationship should not then be able to
invoke the husband-wife privilege nor should the
wife be permitted to invoke it in a Mann Act
prosecution because if the wife can be induced to
be a prostitute, she can also be induced to invoke
her privilege. Justices Warren, Black, and Douglas
dissented.
Insanity-Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943
(D.C. Cir. 1960). Defendant, committed to a
mental hospital because he had been acquitted of
robbery by reason of insanity, moved for a writ of
habeas corpus to secure his release, but it was
denied. On appeal, defendant contended that a
District of Columbia statute which requires one
to be confined in a mental hospital if found not
guilty by reason of insanity at the time he com-
mitted the crime is unconstitutional because it
requires a mandatory commitment without re-
quiring a subsequent hearing or trial to determine
the defendant's present mental status. The Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding the statute constitu-
tional because the defendant may test the legality
of his confinement by habeas corpus proceedings
which will permit the court to decide if he has
sufficiently recovered to be released.
Insanity-Young v. State, 123 So.2d 311 (Miss.
1960). Defendant was convicted of rape. On appeal,
he contended that the trial court erred in denying
a motion to require the state to furnish him the
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services of a psychiatrist. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that there was no showing of
lack of due process or unfairness to defendant
where the only evidence offered during the hearing
on the motion was the testimony of defendant's
counsel that in a ten minute interview some of
defendant's conversation was not rational and that
defendant had not been able to furnish sufficient
facts to prove either that he did or did not commit
the crime.
Insanity-Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 164
A.2d 98 (Pa. 1960). Defendant was convicted of
first-degree murder. On appeal, he contended that
the rule laid down in M'Naghten's case is unsound,
confusing, antiquated, and based on notions of
mental disorders which are discredited by modern
science and that therefore the trial judge com-
mitted prejudicial error by instructing the jury to
decide the case in terms of the M'Naghien rule,
instead of adopting a broader test of insanity and
instructing the jury in its terms. The Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that, since the M'Naghten
rule has become firmly established in Pennsylvania
law, the Supreme Court would not, by blindly
following the criticisms of psychiatric and medical
experts, substitute for such rule, which had been
proven durable and practical for decades, vague
rules which provided no positive standards. Three
justices dissented.
Interstate Transportation of "Stolen" Property
-Lyda v. United States, 279 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.
1960). Defendant was convicted of transporting
stolen pecans in interstate commerce in violation
of 18 U.S.C.A. §2314. On appeal, defendant
claimed that "stolen" as used in the statute means
common law larceny and thus requires an un-
lawful taking and that since he had been entrusted
with the pecans, he had committed embezzlement
which did not violate the statute. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction holding that
"stolen" is not a word of art but was intended by
Congress to have a broad meaning and to en-
compass embezzlement as well as larceny.
Juries-Briggs v. State, 338 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn.
1960). Defendant was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter. On appeal, he contended that the
making of a statement by a juror to the other
jurors during their deliberations to the effect that
defendant had a bad temper and would kill if he
got mad, and in fact had killed his brother, was
reversible error since it violated defendant's con-
stitutional right to meet his opposing witnesses
face to face. The Supreme Court reversed, up-
holding the defendant's contention that the making
of the statement was not harmless error, even
though each of the jurors, when examined on the
motion for a new trial, said that the statement had
no influence on his verdict.
Jury Trial-Boyd v. County of Dade, 123 So.2d
323 (Fla. 1960). Defendants were convicted of
drunken driving in violation of a traffic ordinance
of Dade County. On appeal, they contended that
the trial judge, in denying motions for trial by
jury, violated Sections 3 and 11 of the Declarations
of Rights of the Florida Constitution. The Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that the defendants were
not entitled to trials by jury since the provisions of
the Florida Constitution that the right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate and that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, were
not applicable to offenses against municipal
ordinances, local in their operation.
Mail Fraud-Parr v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct.
1171 (1960). Defendants, school board members
and banks which they controlled, were convicted
in federal court of mail fraud. On certiorari, they
contended that they did not commit the federal
offense but only a state offense, i.e., embezzlement
of state funds. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding there was no mail fraud since defendants
did not use the mails for the particular purpose of
executing the crime but only because the law re-
quired the Board to collect taxes and the mails
were the only logical means to fulfill this duty.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with Justices Harlan and
Stewart concurring, dissented, stating that em-
bezzlement and the process of collection were
inseparable elements of the same fraudulent
scheme.
Mann Act-United States v. McClung, 187
F.Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1960). Defendant was
indicted for knowingly transporting a woman in
interstate commerce for the purpose of sexual
intercourse in violation of the Mann Act. De-
fendant moved to dismiss the indictment claiming
that bringing a willing and unmarriedwoman across
state lines for a casual affair where she did not
suffer from the experience does not violate the
Act. The District Court held that the indictment
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failed to charge a violation because the Act was
clearly intended to condemn habitual immoral
conduct and not single acts of sexual intercourse
with willing women.
Murder-Evans v. United States, 277 F.2d 354
(D.C. Cir. 1960). Defendant was convicted of
second-degree murder. On appeal, she contended
that on a plea of self-defense, evidence of de-
ceased's character is admissible to corroborate
defendant's testimony, and thus the trial court
erred in rejecting testimony by the deceased's wife
that deceased was mentally ill and when intoxi-
cated tended to be aggressive. The Court of Ap-
peals reversed and remanded, holding that on a
plea of self-defense, character evidence is relevant
to establish the possibility that deceased was the
aggressor even though deceased's character was
unknown to defendant. Since the deceased was
drunk when killed, his wife's testimony was
relevant in corroborating defendant's contention
that she had killed deceased in self-defense when
he attacked her.
Parole-Doherty v. United States, 280 F.2d 35
(9th Cir. 1960). Petitioner filed a writ of habeas
corpus after being arrested for parole violation.
Appealing dismissal of his petition, petitioner
claimed that although on parole, he was neverthe-
less within the custody of the attorney general
and was therefore entitled to have the balance of
his sentence credited with the period during which
he was on parole. The Court of Appeals, affirming
the dismissal, held that under 18 U.S.C.A. §4205
which states that "[t]he unexpired term of im-
prisonment of any.., prisoner shall begin from
the date he is returned to the custody of the At-
torney General," the term "custody" means
physical and not legal custody.
Peremptory Challenges-Utah v. Rivenburgh,
355 P.2d 689 (Utah 1960). Defendant, with
another, was convicted of murder in the first
degree. On appeal, defendant contended that
U.C.A. §77-30-2 (1953), which requires joint
defendants to join in their ten collective peremp-
tory challenges, violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment because it dis-
criminates against any joint defendant who cannot
agree with his co-defendant in their collective right
to challenge jurors. The Utah Supreme Court,
affirming the conviction, held that the statute was
constitutional since it applies equally to all de-
fendants tried jointly and does not discriminate
against any individual defendant.
Principals-State v. Burbank, 163 A.2d 639
(Me. 1960). Defendant was tried for murder but
convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, she con-
tended that since she had contributed no physical
effort to bring about the injuries to her child which
eventually resulted in its death, having been in
another room at the time of the killing, she could
not be held as a principal to the crime of man-
slaughter. The Supreme judicial Court affirmed,
holding that, by being "constructively" present
at the time of the killing, and by predetermining
that if the child was abnormal "something would
have to be done with it" and, upon its birth, en-
couraging her father to "hit it in the head," de-
fendant participated in the crime to an extent
which the law recognizes as sufficient to bring her
within the category of a principal to the crime of
manslaughter.
Robbery-Hermann v. State, 123 So.2d 846
(Miss. 1960). Defendants were convicted of armed
robbery. On appeal, they contended that the state
failed to prove them guilty of the crime of robbery
in that the "taking" of the tankful of gasoline
from the filling station came after the station
attendant had filled their gasoline tank but before
they put the attendant "in fear" by pointing a
rifle at him in a threatening manner. The Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that even though the
defendants did not point their rifle at the attendant
until after their gasoline tank was filled, the taking
of complete control and dominion over the gasoline
and the actual "taking" and asportation of it was
contemporaneous with the pointing of the rifle at
the attendant and, therefore, the crime of robbery
was committed.
Scientific Evidence-Washington v. Baker, 355
P.2d 806 (Wash. 1960). Defendant was convicted
of negligent homicide arising out of a fatal auto-
mobile accident. On appeal, he contended that
admitting the results of a voluntary breathalyzer
test showing the alcoholic content in his blood was
error because he had drunk cough syrup containing
forty-five per cent alcohol less than fifteen minutes
before the test. The Washington Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, holding that before the
results of a breathalyzer test may be admitted, the
prosecution must produce prima facie evidence
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